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             NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3619 
___________ 
 
CLARK JEAN JUNIOR JEAN BAPTISTE 
a/k/a Clark Jean Baptiste, a/k/a Clark Baptiste, a/k/a Stevenson Jean Baptiste, 
                                                                                                Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                         Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A098-505-094) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 23, 2016 
Before:  SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 23, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Clark Jean Junior Jean-Baptiste (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, has requested 
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dated September 2, 2016.  
Finding that Petitioner’s claims all lack merit, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Haiti.  He entered the United States in 2006 
when he was 16 years old.  Petitioner became a lawful permanent resident, then 
committed several crimes, while residing in Irvington, New Jersey. 
In March 2015, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear, charging removability 
based on aspects of his criminal history.  An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that 
Petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1227(a)(2)(C).1  
  Petitioner then applied for asylum and withholding/deferral of removal.  
Petitioner and his father, Etienne, testified at an evidentiary hearing.  Etienne in particular 
testified that he was a lieutenant in the Haitian army under then-president Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide until the 1991 coup, after which Etienne fled to the United States.  When asked 
why he feared for Petitioner’s safety, were he returned to Haiti, Etienne offered little 
more than generalities:  “Well, because of the way things are in Haiti . . . . [W]hen you go 
to Haiti, [ ] it’s either you go to jail, or you get killed.”   
After hearing testimony from the witnesses and considering documentary evidence 
submitted by both sides, the IJ denied all relief.  In rejecting Petitioner’s request for relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), the IJ found that although Petitioner 
                                                                
1 Pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” after 
admission to the United States is removable.  Pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(C), most firearm 
convictions render an alien removable. 
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“claims that he would be tortured because of the political actions of his father, his father 
fled Haiti over 25 years ago, and there’s no evidence that he has been threatened, 
targeted, or identified since that time.”     
 The BIA affirmed.  It reasoned that Petitioner is an aggravated felon under 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)—and thus ineligible for asylum—because he was convicted of 
robbery in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and was sentenced to three years in prison.2  
The BIA reasoned further that Petitioner failed to demonstrate eligibility for withholding 
of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act because the articulated bases for 
relief were either non-cognizable or without record support.  Finally, for the reasons 
given by the IJ, the BIA determined that Petitioner was not entitled to CAT relief.   
This timely petition for review followed.  On October 11, 2016, a panel of this 
Court denied Petitioner’s motions to stay removal and for appointment of counsel. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), limited by § 1252(a)(2) to 
constitutional claims and questions of law because Petitioner was found removable as an 
aggravated felon.3  We review constitutional and other legal questions de novo. 
 Of the claims raised by Petitioner over which we may exercise jurisdiction, none 
has any merit.4  Indeed, we roundly rejected certain of his claims—arguing for 
                                                                
2 Section 1101(a)(43)(G) provides one of the many meanings of “aggravated felony”:  “a 
theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term 
of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 
 
3 Petitioner does not challenge his removability as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Therefore, this issue is waived.  
Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 609 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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recognition of “criminal deportees” as a statutorily protected “social group,” and for our 
adoption in immigration cases of a “state-created danger” theory of relief—both of which 
we rejected a decade ago in precedential opinions.5  In addition, we deem irrelevant 
Petitioner’s claim that since he was not convicted of a “particularly serious crime” with 
an aggregate sentence of at least five years, he evades the bar to relief under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); Petitioner was found ineligible for asylum (only) not under that 
provision, but under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).  Finally, while Petitioner argues that his due process rights were 
violated during the removal hearing, he does not support this claim with any substance 
sufficient to make it reviewable by this Court.6  
For the above-stated reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
4 Regarding whether Petitioner is entitled to CAT relief, we note that the inquiry has two 
distinct parts:  one is factual (“what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed[?]”), 
and one is a legal (“does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of 
torture?”).  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  The BIA deferred to 
the IJ’s factual finding that Petitioner was unlikely to be harmed upon removal to Haiti.  
Because of Petitioner’s aggravated felony conviction, that finding is unreviewable by this 
Court.  See Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507 (3d Cir. 2012). 
   
5 See Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e hardly can 
conceive that Congress would select criminals as a group warranting special protection in 
removal cases.”); Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 217 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We . . . hold 
that the state-created danger exception has no place in our immigration jurisprudence.”). 
 
6 See John Wyeth & Bros. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1997) (arguments raised in passing are considered waived). 
